Macroeconometric evaluation of active labour market policies in Germany : a dynamic panel approach using regional data by Hujer, Reinhard et al.
Macroeconometric Evaluation of Active Labour Market
Policies in Germany -
A Dynamic Panel Approach Using Regional Data¤
Reinhard Hujery Uwe Blienz
Goethe-University, Frankfurt IAB, Nuremberg
IZA, Bonn
Marco Caliendox Christopher Zeiss{
Goethe-University, Frankfurt Goethe-University, Frankfurt
First draft: February, 2002
This draft: October 11, 2002
Working Paper
Abstract Most evaluation studies of active labour market policies (ALMP) focus on the
microeconometric evaluation approach using individual data. However, as the microeconometric
approach usually ignores impacts on the non-participants, it should be seen as a ﬁrst step to a
complete evaluation which has to be followed by an analysis on the macroeconomic level. As
a starting point for our analysis we discuss the eﬀects of ALMP in a theoretical labour market
framework augmented by ALMP. We estimate the impacts of ALMP in Germany for the time
period 1999-2001 with regional data of 175 labour oﬃce districts. Due to the high persistence
of German labour market data the application of a dynamic model is crucial. Furthermore our
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II1 Introduction
In view of the immense spending on active labour market policies (ALMP) in Germany (about 43
bn DM in 2001) and their debatable success, the evaluation literature has been growing rapidly
in recent years.1 Most studies focus on the microeconometric approach using individual data.
The importance of this approach is straightforward and the framework for such an analysis is well
developed.2 However, as the microeconometric approach usually ignores impacts on the non-
participants, it should be seen as a ﬁrst step to a complete evaluation which has to be followed
by a macroeconometric analysis. Instead of looking at the eﬀect on individual performance, we
would like to ﬁnd out if the ALMP represent a net gain to the whole economy. This is likely to
be the case only if the total number of jobs is positively aﬀected by ALMP.
Most macroeconometric evaluations of ALMP are based on panel data models, since a single
time series for one country or region usual does not provide enough observations. Between these
studies, two major strands can be distinguished. First, authors like e.g. Forslund and Krueger
(1994) or Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) use variation in programme scale across regional units
(jurisdictions) combined with data at the regional level to estimate the eﬀects. Second authors
like Jackman, Pissarides, and Savouri (1990), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) or OECD
(1993) use variation in programme scale across diﬀerent countries even though such an analysis
might suﬀer from the heterogeneous policy measures between the countries. As we want to
evaluate the eﬀects of ALMP in Germany for the recent years, our analysis will use a regional
data set that enables use to estimate the net eﬀect of ALMP for Germany .
In 1998 the legal basis for the labour market policy in Germany has been changed to the new
Social Code SGB III. Changes have been made not only in the objectives, like a more intensive
focus on problem groups of the labour market, but also in the institutional organization of
labour market policy, leading to decentralization and more ﬂexibility in the regional allocation
of resources to diﬀerent measures. This decentralization allows an adjustment to the situation
on the local labour markets on one hand, and requires, on the other hand, that any evaluation
takes regional ﬂexibility into stronger considerations than before. The importance of suitable
data which allows to take regional heterogeneity into account has to be stressed. Especially in
Germany this is problematic due to permanent adjustments in the regional delimitations of the
labour oﬃce districts (’Arbeitsamtsbezirke’). In contrast to other evaluation studies, this is not
problematic for us because for the time span under consideration, no such changes occurred.
The aim of the study is to add a new perspective to the evaluation of ALMP in Germany.
This is done by using regional data to obtain macroeconomic or net eﬀects of these measures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the micro-
and macroeconometric evaluation approaches. Highlighting the advantages and shortcomings
of each approach makes clear their necessity as additional ingredients to a complete evaluation.
Section 3 presents brieﬂy the possible eﬀects of ALMP in a macroeconomic framework. Following
that, section 4 gives an overview of ALMP in Germany, discusses the importance of regional
analysis and reviews the previous empirical ﬁndings from macroeconometric evaluations for
Germany. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, where we ﬁrst present the dynamic panel
1See Hagen and Steiner (2000) or Hujer and Caliendo (2001) for extensive overviews regarding micro- and
macroeconometric evaluations of ALMP in Germany.
2See e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) or Smith (2000).
1data estimation approach before we discuss our results. Finally, section 6 concludes and gives
an outlook for further research.
2 Micro- and Macroeconometric Evaluation
The ideal evaluation process consists of three steps. First, the impact of the programme on
the participating individual should be estimated. Second, it should be examined if the impacts
are large enough to yield net social gains. Finally, it should be answered if this is the best
outcome that could have been achieved for the money spent (Fay, 1996). We will discuss the
ﬁrst two-steps, namely the micro- and the macroeconometric evaluation.
The main question of microeconometric evaluations is if the interesting outcome variable for
an individual is aﬀected by the participation in an ALMP programme. That being done, the
direct gain can be compared with the associated costs and the success of the programme can be
judged. However, microeconometric approaches estimate in nearly all cases the eﬀect of treat-
ment on the treated. One important concept in this context is the stable unit treatment value
assumption (SUTVA, Rubin, 1980). One implication of SUTVA is that the eﬀect of the inter-
vention on each individual is not aﬀected by the participation decision of any other individual,
i.e. the treatment eﬀect for each person is independent of the treatment of other individuals.
This assumption guarantees that average treatment eﬀects can be estimated independently of
the size and composition of the treatment population. Among other things SUTVA excludes
cross eﬀects or general equilibrium eﬀects. Even though its validity facilitates a manageable
formal setup, in practical applications it is frequently questionable whether it holds. Looking
at the immense amounts spent on ALMP in Germany (for details see section 4) and the large
scale of the programmes, spill-over eﬀects on non-participants are very likely.3 Therefore the
microeconometric approach is partial-analytic and should only be seen as one-step to a complete
evaluation, or as Heckman (1999) puts it, microdata are no panacea and must be used in con-
junction with aggregate time-series data to estimate the full general-equilibrium consequences
of policies.
The main problem is here that a positive eﬀect on the individual level need not to be
positive on the aggregate level. Particularly ALMP is often suspected to have a positive eﬀect
on the individual level but a zero or even a negative eﬀect for the whole economy. In this
context, deadweight losses and substitution eﬀects have received substantial attention in the
literature (see e.g. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) or OECD (1993)). If the outcome
of the programme is not diﬀerent from what would have happened in its absence, we talk
about a deadweight loss. A common example is the hiring from the target group that would
have occurred also without the programme. If a worker is taken on by a ﬁrm in a subsidized
job instead of an unsubsidized worker who would have been hired otherwise, we talk about a
substitution eﬀect. The net short-term employment eﬀect in this case is zero. Such eﬀects are
likely in the case of subsidies for private-sector work. There is always a risk that the employers
hold back ordinary job creation in order to be able to take advantage of the subsidies. In order
to minimize this danger, a principle of additionality may be imposed. Another problem might
3If we look at the typical small-scale U.S. programmes on the other hand, the occurrence of such eﬀects is
less likely.
2be that ALMP may crowd out regular employment. This can be seen as a generalization of the
so called displacement eﬀect. This eﬀect typically refers to displacement in the product market,
e.g. if ﬁrms with subsidized workers may increase output, but displace (reduce) output among
ﬁrms who do not have subsidized workers. Calmfors (1994) also stresses the importance of tax
eﬀects in the sense that programmes have to be ﬁnanced by taxes which distort the choices of
both participants and non-participants.
To see how problems can arise through the neglect of such eﬀects let us discuss an example.
As the outcome variable of interest in Germany is usually the employment situation of partici-
pating individuals, we consider a wage subsidy programme that aims to increase the employment
probability of long-term unemployed, by giving employees a subsidy if they hire an individual
out of the target group. The usual microeconometric approach analyses the eﬀects on the labour
supply side of the market by looking at the individual’s performance. So if the individual gets
a job because of the subsidy, the programme was a success. The shortcoming is, however, the
possible occurrence of substitution or displacement eﬀects, e.g. if an unsubsidized worker is
ﬁred to hire a subsidized worker. Hujer, Caliendo, and Radic (2001) suggest estimating the suc-
cess of wage subsidies on the labour demand side of the market by looking at the employment
situation within the ﬁrm. Doing so, substitution eﬀects within the ﬁrm already ’net out’ and
give a clearer picture of the net eﬀects. Displacement eﬀects between ﬁrms, however, cannot be
detected with this approach. Clearly, these eﬀects have to be taken into account if one intends
to make statements about the net eﬀect of ALMP.
3 Macroeconomic Analysis of Active Labour Market Pol-
icy
The estimation of macroeconomic eﬀects is not straightforward, and compared to the number of
micro-analyses the existing literature is relatively small. The major obstacle, however, is that a
macroeconometric analysis of ALMP should be based on a theoretical framework that explains
the relevant labour market variables (e.g. regular employment or unemployment). Thereby the
main problem is not the availability of an appropriate theory but the availability of suitable
data in order to implement the theory in an econometric model.
Considering the available theories, the question arises which theoretical framework is ap-
propriate for the analysis of ALMP. Leaving aside the traditional way of ’cheating the Phillips
curve’, i.e. improving the unemployment-inﬂation trade-oﬀ and thereby reducing the nonacceler-
ating inﬂation rate of unemployment (Baily and Tobin, 1977), a model is needed that generates
a positive equilibrium unemployment rate and is also capable of incorporating ALMP. For the
theoretical analysis of ALMP the two most used models are the Layard and Nickell (1986)
framework and the search model framework (see e.g. Pissarides (2000)). Both models diﬀer
by their primary reason for equilibrium unemployment. In the Layard and Nickell framework,
unemployment is generated through a wage setting process that pushes the wage rate over the
equilibrium rate generated by labour demand and labour supply. One possible explanation for
these wage distortions is the power of unions in the wage bargaining process or eﬃciency wages.
The Layard and Nickell framework is particularly suitable to consider the eﬀects of ALMP on
labour markets where wage distortions are a serious problem.
3Search models on the other hand assign the cause of unemployment to a time and cost
consuming matching process. The matching process serves as a proxy for the diﬀerences in
the geographic and skill characteristics between the vacant jobs and the job seekers. Therefore
the matching process can be used to summarize mismatch problems and structural imbalances
on the labour market. Due to the traditional intention of ALMP to overcome these problems,
the matching process should be one important aspect for the analysis of ALMP. Theoretical
considerations based on the impacts of ALMP in these two frameworks are given for example
by Johnson and Layard (1986), Holmlund and Linden (1993) or Calmfors and Lang (1995).
For the analysis of ALMP clearly a combination of both frameworks as presented by Calmfors
and Lang (1995) is useful, since mismatch and wage distortions are problems of the labour
market especially in Germany. Calmfors (1994) and Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstr¨ om (2002)
identiﬁed within such a theoretical framework various eﬀects of ALMP. In the following we will
brieﬂy present the most important ones.
Eﬀects on the Matching Process ALMP can improve the matching process through several
channels. First, ALMP can improve the active search behaviour of the participants. Second,
ALMP can speed up the matching process by adjusting the structure of the labour supply
to demand. Here we primarily think of retraining programmes that adapt the skills of the
unemployed to the requirements of the vacant jobs. Third, the participation in an ALMP
programme can serve as a substitute for work experience that reduces the employer’s uncertainty
about the employability of the job applicant.
If ALMP can improve the matching process, the question is what are the eﬀects on regular
employment or the wages. First of all an improved matching process means that for a given stock
of vacancies there is a greater inﬂow into employment.4 Furthermore, the improved matching
process reduces the average duration a vacancy remains unﬁlled. Since this reduces the costs
of maintaining a vacancy ﬁrms provide more vacancies which is equivalent to an increase in the
labour demand. The same eﬀect also improves the ﬁrm’s position in a wage bargaining process,
since the ﬁrm can expect to ﬁll a vacancy much quicker if a worker was laid oﬀ. Therefore the
improved matching process also leads to a reduction of the wage rate.
ALMP programmes are also expected to have negative eﬀects on the matching process, i.e.
so called locking-in eﬀects. If a participation in an ALMP programme is associated with full time
employment, there might be insuﬃcient time for actively searching a regular job. In this case
the search eﬀectiveness of the participants is lower than the search eﬀectiveness of the openly
unemployed (Holmlund and Linden, 1993). Since this locking-in eﬀect vanishes at the moment
when the programme expires, the question is if the positive eﬀects on the search eﬀectiveness
persist after the participation has ended.
Eﬀects on Welfare of the Unemployed If an ALMP programme rises the re-employment
probability or if the compensation level is higher than the unemployment beneﬁts, the ALMP
programme rises the expected welfare of the unemployed. This is caused by the fact that an
unemployed person faces a positive probability to being placed into a programme and thus faces
a rise in the expected income. In the context of a wage bargaining process this is the same
4This is equivalent to an inward shift of the Beveridge Curve.
4as an increase of the fallback income, i.e. the income that is obtained if the bargaining fails
and the worker becomes unemployed (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991). The rise of the
fallback income leads to a higher outcome for the wage rate, since the position of the workers
in the bargaining process is improved. This eﬀect of ALMP on the wage pressure is indeed
not avoidable, since every improvement of the situation of the unemployed is connected with a
reduction of the welfare losses.
Eﬀects on the Competition in the Labour Market ALMP (especially training pro-
grammes) are expected to improve the skills of the participants, i.e. to make the participants
more competitive. This means not only that there is an improved competition between the unem-
ployed but also an improvement of the competition between the employed and the unemployed,
i.e. between the insiders and the outsiders. Additionally, ALMP can aﬀect the competition if
it stimulates the participants to search more actively (i.e. to counteract the discouraged worker
eﬀect) or it helps to rise the labour force participation. In both cases there is a rise in the
eﬀective labour supply, that leads to a reduction of the wage rate.
Eﬀects on the Productivity ALMP programmes that improve the skills of the participants
or serve as a substitute for work experience, can be expected to improve or to maintain the
productivity of the participants. Considering a conventional labour demand condition, a rise
in the productivity would lead to an increase of employment for a given wage rate. Calmfors
(1994) notes that the rise in the productivity is not self evident, because on the other hand
there is the opportunity to produce the same output with fewer but more eﬃcient workers.
Additionally, Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstr¨ om (2002) note that the rise in the productivity
of the participants may also have a wage rising eﬀect through a rise in the reservation wage of
the participants.
In order to set up the econometric model for the evaluation, we can use the preceding
discussion to ﬁnd the relevant relationships. In particular, theory suggests that there are eﬀects
on the matching process, on employment and on the wage rate. Therefore, a straightforward
empirical implementation would be the estimation of a matching function (see e.g. Boeri and
Burda (1996)) or a wage equation (see e.g. Calmfors and Forslund (1991)). Unfortunately, data
limitations do not allow us to estimate such structural relationships. For this reason we follow
the strategy of Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) and base our empirical analysis on a reduced form
relationship, explaining the total unemployment rate in the economy. Here we deﬁne the total
unemployment as the stock of job seekers, i.e. the sum of openly unemployed and the programme
participants. This is necessary to avoid estimating the bookkeeping eﬀect, i.e. that a programme
expansion leads automatically to a reduction in the stock of the openly unemployed.
The reduced form approach enables us to estimate the total net eﬀect of ALMP, i.e the eﬀect
through all channels discussed above (Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstr¨ om, 2002).
Finally, it should be noted that only an empirical model using structural relationships makes
it possible to estimate the diﬀerent eﬀects of ALMP, although the identiﬁcation of more then
one eﬀect will in most cases fail due to data limitations.
54 Active Labour Market Policy in Germany
We will start this section by giving a brief overview of the institutional setup and the instruments
of ALMP in Germany, especially regarding the development after the introduction of the SGB
III in the year 1998. Following that, we will describe the dataset used in our analysis, before
we discuss the importance of regional analysis and the regional variation of the data at hand.
Finally we review the previous empirical ﬁndings for Germany obtained from macroeconometric
evaluations.
4.1 Institutional Setup and Instruments
Labour market policies in Germany are organized by the Federal Employment Oﬃce (’Bundes-
anstalt f¨ ur Arbeit’). Up to 1998, the legal basis for the labour market policy in Germany has
been the work support act (’Arbeitsf¨ orderungsgesetz’, AFG), founded in 1969. From that point,
the new Social Code SGB III (’Sozialgesetzbuch’) took over this role. Changes have been made
not only in the objectives, like a more intensive focus on problem groups of the labour market,
but also in the institutional organization of labour market policy, leading to decentralization
and more ﬂexibility in the regional allocation of resources to diﬀerent measures.
Since the data we analyse ranges from 1999 to 2001, we focus on the SGB III and discuss the
AFG very brieﬂy. A good overview of AFG’s historical evolution can be found in Staat (1997).5
The improvement of the labour force structure, i.e. the adjustment of the labour supply to the
changing labour demand, has been the primary goal in the early years. It was aimed to attend
the continual growth of the economy that changed the labour market conditions permanently,
with a continuous adjustment of the labour force structure to fulﬁll the new requirements. In
detail, a short supply of jobs with speciﬁc (high-level) skills as well as an excess supply of jobs
requiring low skills only was to be avoided. These goals had to be revised quite soon. At the
end of 1973, the sharp rising unemployment rate in connection with the ﬁrst oil price shock
drove attention to the ﬁght against this development. This becomes clear when we look at the
participation structure of the ALMP. In the early 1970s, less than 15 per cent of all participants
had been unemployed before participation, whereas in the 1980s this was the case for almost 80
per cent.
After some innovations and amendments, the AFG has been replaced by the SGB III in
1998. A good overview of the most relevant reforms can be found in Fitzenberger and Speckesser
(2000). Sell (1998) presents an extensive discussion of the new SGB III, regarding especially the
self-responsibility of employees for their own labour market success. Fertig and Schmidt (2000)
explain and classify the diﬀerent measures of employment promotion and explicitly distinguish
between non-discretionary and discretionary measures. Brinkmann (1999) discusses aspects of
decentralisation and regionalisation as well as the now mandatory output evaluations.
Whereas the AFG had been implemented under full employment conditions, the SGB III
was born in a rougher economic situation, where labour market policy is aﬀected by narrower
budget constraints. Some of the AFG’s objectives, like the securance of a high employment ratio
and the avoidance of low-quality employment, were dropped. The most important goal (x7,3
5The main goals can be found in xx1,2 AFG and have been: (a) securance of a high employment ratio, (b)
avoidance of low-quality employment, (c) improvement of the structure of the labour force, (d) promotion of
mobility, (e) social goals and (f) promotion of target groups.
6SGB III) is the (re-)integration of problem groups in the regular labour market whilst using the
resources in an eﬃcient way (’Grundsatz der Wirtschaftlichkeit und Sparsamkeit’).
As the government sees itself in a promoting role only, the SGB III places particular emphasis
on the fact that employees have to act on their own authority regarding their labour market
success. This comes together with a tightening of the reasonableness-clause (’Zumutbarkeits-
klausel’), which for example makes it harder for unemployed to turn down job oﬀers.
Besides the change of the objectives, there have been organizational changes, too, increasing
the ﬂexibility of ALMP on a regional and local level. The local employment oﬃces are now al-
lowed to allocate their budgets relatively freely to diﬀerent measures. According to xx71b, SGB
IV, several categories of ALMP must be ﬁnanced by one single budget item (’Eingliederungsti-
tel’), which is then assigned to the regional employment oﬃce. The new feature of the SGB III
is now that the employment oﬃces are free to set their priorities on how much weight to assign
to each programme. This leaves the decision of the mix of instruments free to the particular
regional branch of the Federal Employment Oﬃce (Brinkmann, 1999). This decentralization
allows an adjustment to the situation on the local labour markets.
Furthermore, 10% of the budget can be used for ’free promotion’ (’Freie F¨ orderung’, x10,
SGB III), allowing a more individualized support. Each employment oﬃce has considerable
ﬂexibility to act with local focus, e.g. by implementing measures which are custom-made for
the situation at the local labour market.
Another promising feature is the so-called ’Eingliederungsplan’ to avoid long-term unemploy-
ment. Under this new plan, the local labour exchange and the unemployed have to establish
which active measures or which action from the unemployed will help to avoid a drifting oﬀ into
(long-term) unemployment within six months after the beginning of the unemployment spell.
Other interesting new measures, like the special programme to combat youth unemploy-
ment (’JUMP’), measures which are implemented in pathﬁnder regions and aim to promote
the employment of low-qualiﬁed individuals or long-term unemployed (’CAST’) as well as the
reform law regarding the ALMP instruments (’JOB-AQTIV’), cannot be discussed here. For a
comprehensive overview see Fitzenberger and Hujer (2002).
Another new point in the SGB III is the mandatory output evaluation. The employment
oﬃces are now required to draw up output evaluations (’Eingliederungsbilanzen’, x11, SGB
III), including most importantly the employment status of each participant some time after
completion of a measure.
As our discussion made clear, any evaluation of the eﬃciency of labour market policy must
give more consideration than before to regional ﬂexibility and take into account the various
support strategies developed by the employment oﬃces (Brinkmann, 1999). This is what we are
trying to do in section 5.
Table 1 shows the spending on labour market policies in Germany from 1999 to 2001.
Whereas in 1999 only 33.5% of the total spending have been dedicated to active measures,
the share rose to 34% in 2001. In West Germany, the share of ALMP’s rose from 27.6% to
30.3% whereas it decreased slightly in East Germany from around 42.9% to 40%.
7Table 1: Spending on Labour Market Policies in Germany, 1999-2001
1999 2000 2001
in bn % of in bn % of in bn % of
DM total DM total DM total
Germany
Total Spending 135.29 125.96 128.65
Passive Labour Market Policies 81.19 60.01 73.93 58.69 75.82 58.94
Active Labour Market Policies 45.30 33.48 43.04 34.17 43.65 33.93
Vocational training (VT) 13.20 9.76 13.31 10.57 13.66 10.62
Job Creation Schemes (JCS) 7.81 5.77 7.20 5.71 5.82 4.52
Structural Adjustment Schemes (SAS) 1.48 1.09 2.66 1.11 1.70 1.32
SAM-East for private ﬁrms (SAS-East) 3.57 2.64 1.27 1.01 0.39 0.31
Free Support (FS) 1.09 0.81 1.13 0.89 1.20 0.93
West Germany
Total Spending 83.25 78.14 80.29
Passive Labour Market Policies 53.31 64.03 47.11 60.29 48.72 60.68
Active Labour Market Policies 22.98 27.60 23.92 30.62 24.30 30.26
Vocational training (VT) 7.78 9.34 7.94 10.16 8.19 10.20
Job Creation Schemes (JCS) 2.14 2.58 2.00 2.56 1.69 2.10
Structural Adjustment Schemes (SAS) 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.31
SAM-East for Private Firms (SAS-East) 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
Free Support (FS) 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.70 0.52 0.65
East Germany
Total Spending 52.04 47.83 48.35
Passive Labour Market Policies 27.88 53.58 26.82 56.08 27.10 56.05
Active Labour Market Policies 22.32 42.89 19.12 39.97 19.35 40.01
Vocational training (VT) 5.43 10.43 5.37 11.24 5.47 11.30
Job Creation Schemes (JCS) 5.66 10.88 5.20 10.87 4.13 8.55
Structural Adjustment Schemes (SAS) 1.23 2.36 1.15 2.40 1.45 3.01
SAM-East for Private Firms (SAS-East) 3.43 6.59 1.24 2.60 0.40 0.81
Free Support (FS) 0.59 1.14 0.58 1.22 0.67 1.40
Source: Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Arbeit (2002)
One obvious reason for the limited success in switching resources into active measures, is the
constantly high unemployment rate in East Germany (see Table 2). As unemployment beneﬁts
are entitlement-programmes and most active measures are discretionary in nature, the former
increase automatically with a rising unemployment rate, whereas the latter are easier disposable.
The most important measures in 2001 have been vocational training (’F¨ orderung der be-
ruﬂichen Weiterbildung’, VT) with 13.66 bn DM and subsidized employment, consisting of
traditional job creation schemes (’Arbeitsbeschaﬀungsmaßnahmen’, JCS) with 5.82 bn DM and
structural adjustment schemes (’Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen’, SAS) with 1.70 bn DM.
In principle, public vocational training under the AFG comprised three types of training
measures, namely further training (’Fortbildung’), retraining (’Umschulung’) and training to
familiarize with a new occupation (’Einarbeitung’).6 The ﬁrst two types have been summarized
in one item (xx77-96, 153-159, 517 SGB III).
6See Hujer and Wellner (2000) for an overview of vocational training under the AFG.
8Table 2: Unemployment Rate in Germany, 1995-2001
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Germany 10.4 11.5 12.7 12.3 11.7 10.7 10.3
West Germany 9.3 10.1 11.0 10.5 9.9 8.7 8.3
East Germany 14.9 16.7 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.8 18.9
Source: Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Arbeit (2002)
The latter is now part of the employment subsidies and will not be discussed here.7 The
Federal Employment Oﬃce pays the costs of the training measures and a subsistence allowance
(’Unterhaltsgeld’) to the participants, which amounts to 60 per cent (67 with one or more
children) of the previous net income (equal to unemployment beneﬁt). The main goals are to
re-integrate unemployed by improving their skills and turn away the danger of unemployment
for employees at risk.
Let us now turn to subsidized employment programmes, consisting of traditional job creation
schemes and structural adjustment schemes. JCS is the more important programme in West
and East Germany and the spending in 2001 sum up to 5.82 bn DM. JCS (xx 260-271 SGB
III) are normally only available to non-proﬁt organisations. They should support activities
which are of value to the society and additional in nature, that is without the subsidy they
could not be executed. They include limited employment for long-term unemployed in projects
to improve their labour market prospects. Even though JCS should be co-ﬁnanced measures
where between 30% and 75% of the costs are subsidies by the FEO and the rest is paid by the
implementing institution (public or private legal entities, mainly municipalities), exceptions can
be made in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100%). The subsidy is normally paid
for 12 months but can be extended up to 24 and even 36 months if it is followed by regular
employment. Priority is given to projects which improve the chances for permanent jobs, that
support structural improvement in social or environmental services or that aim at the integration
of extremely hard-to-place individuals.
Especially in East Germany, structural adjustment schemes (xx272-279 SGB III) play a
prominent role, the spending amounting to 1.45 bn DM in 2001. Their goal is, analogous
to JCS, the integration into regular employment, but less severe eligibility criteria apply to
participants, so not only unemployed but also individuals threatened by unemployment may
participate. The SAS consist of a wage subsidy equal to the average amount of unemployment
allowance or assistance (including contributions to the social security system) which is paid on
the Federal territory. The subsidy is typically paid for a maximum period of 36 (48) months.
In East Germany, the SAS may be implemented by public institutions and private companies
(’SAM Ost f¨ ur Wirtschaftsunternehmen’, SAS-East), whereas in West Germany only the ﬁrst is
possible.8
Looking at the distribution of the spending on the diﬀerent measures shows considerable
diﬀerences between West and East Germany. The dominantly used measure in the West is
vocational training, where the expenditures amount to 8.19 bn DM, corresponding to a share of
7See Hujer, Caliendo, and Radic (2001) for an overview.
8Since January 1998 SAS-East could also be requested in West-Berlin.
910.2% of the total spending. The next important measures are JCS with a share of 2.1% and
SAS with 0.31%.
In East Germany, the situation is much more balanced. Again, VT is the most important
programme (5.47 bn DM, 11.3%), but JCS (4.13 bn DM, 8.55%) follows closely.
The discrepancy between both parts gets also clear if we look at Figures B.1 and B.2 in
the appendix. They show the number of participants in the three most important programmes
for West and East Germany from 4/1998 to 4/2001. In West Germany, on average 208.000
individuals participated in VT in every quarter, 55.000 in JCS and around 10.000 in SAS. The
ratio between participants and unemployed has been 1:10. The situation in East Germany is as
expected remarkably diﬀerent. First of all, the participation in the diﬀerent measures is more
balanced. The most important measure is JCS with 137.000 participants on average, followed
by SAS with 113.000 and VT with 131.000 and the ratio between participants and unemployed,
has been 1:3.
After looking at the spending on the diﬀerent measures and the participating individuals, it
is also interesting to look at the average duration of the measures. This should give us important
hints on the lag structure for our subsequent analysis. The average duration of the measures
under consideration in 1999 lies between 8 and 10 months. JCS have the shortest duration with
8.3 months, followed by VT (8.4 months) and SAS with 9.8 months (Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Arbeit,
2000).
4.2 The Dataset and the Importance of Regional Analysis
The data of this study refers to labour market regions deﬁned by the administrative areas of
the regional oﬃces of the FEO. These are the adequate units of the analysis since, as we have
seen, the regional oﬃces take some important decisions concerning the mix of measures of active
labour market policy. Furthermore, the allocation of funds is done by indicators calculated for
these areas. These indicators are: The local job seeker rate (this is the unemployment rate
extended by the rate of people participating in measures of active labour market policy), the
growth rate of employment, the rate of long-term unemployed and the rate of people who leave
unemployment to start a regular job (Blien, 2002). The sources of the data on unemployment
and labour market policy measures used in this study are the internal administrative processes
of the FEO. Recently administrative checks have shown that a special kind of data with the
same origin is biased. Especially one variable which gives the ﬁgure of job placements done by
the local oﬃces of the BA is aﬀected by this bias. This variable is not used in our study. There
are no hints that there are similar problems with other variables. On the contrary, since the
data are used for the allocation of funds and for administrative purposes associated with legal
claims it could be expected that they are especially reliable. A detailed description of the data
used can be found in the Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.
A special diﬃculty of regional labour market analyses is that the regional units used, i.e. the
administrative areas of the local oﬃces, are not constant in time. Especially in East Germany
their shape has been changed very often. Therefore it is not always clear whether e.g. a change
in the number of unemployed registered in a special oﬃce is due to a change in the conditions on
the local labour market or whether it is due to a change in the size of the area which refers to this
oﬃce. For the time span in question 1999 - 2001 no such changes occurred. Therefore diﬃcult
10procedures of recalculation could be avoided. The data base of this study is taken from the
Pallas-reg system of the Institute for Employment Research. This system includes aggregated
data originated by the administrative processes in the FEO and data from other sources. The
advantage of these data is that the information is made consistent in the dimensions of time
and space. This is not an easy task since there have been redeﬁnitions of the data with respect
to its content. The administrative processes changed during time according to diﬀerent legal
deﬁnitions and varying internal procedures of the Federal Employment Services. The data are
prepared in a way that they can be used in scientiﬁc research.
The regional oﬃces are free to decide between job creation schemes and measures of voca-
tional training. Typically, in situations with great imbalances in the labour market, JCS are
preferred to training measures, whereas in areas with low unemployment rates hardly any JCS
are started. This can easily be seen from a comparison of the Figures B.3 and B.4 in the ap-
pendix. Figure B.3 shows the distribution of the job seeker rate in Germany. It is a very severe
problem in the East. The lowest rates can be found in the south. Figure B.4 gives the relation
between people participating in job creation schemes to those involved in measures of vocational
training. The comparison of both maps shows the logic behind the regional distribution of the
measures, since training is not very useful in areas where hardly any jobs are available. The size
of the regional units used for the analyses can be seen from the ﬁgures. They show the great
variation of the indicators used. The extreme values concerning the job seeker rate are 4.24%
in Freising (Southern Germany, to the North of Munich) and 33.0% in Sangershausen (Eastern
Germany). Under the institutional structure of one country, very diﬀerent labour market sit-
uations are discernible. Even if only Western Germany is regarded, there are high diﬀerences
with 18.32% in Gelsenkirchen as the maximum value. These regional disparities provoke very
diﬀerent strategies of labour market policy. Regional analysis can be used to gain variance
(Krugman, 1991) for economic analyses. The estimates can be done with far greater precision.
Compared to data on individual participants of labour market policy schemes, regional data
show e.g. indirect eﬀects concerning the substitution of regular employment. The variation of
conditions on the labour market is under the constraint of the same institutional setting. Only
between East and West Germany there are some diﬀerences in the laws to be applied and there
are, of course, major diﬀerences with respect to the history of both areas and the productivity
of the economy.
4.3 Previous Empirical Findings for Germany
We will now give a brief overview of the empirical ﬁndings from macroeconometric evaluations
for Germany on a regional level.
B¨ uttner and Prey (1998) use yearly data (1986 to 1993) from 74 planning regions of West
Germany to evaluate the eﬀects of training programmes and public sector job creation on the
labour market eﬃciency. They use a disequilibrium approach and their results suggest that
training programmes have no eﬀect and job creation programmes have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on the matching eﬃciency. Prey (1999) extends this work by additionally controlling for
the regional age structure and recipients of social assistance and estimating separately for men
and women. She ﬁnds that VT increases (decreases) the mismatch for women (men), whereas
JCS decreases the mismatch for men.
11Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998) use the data from 35 local labour oﬃce districts to evaluate
training programmes in East Germany. They use monthly data from 1992 to 1994 and ﬁnd that
the programmes have negative eﬀects on the regional wages.
Steiner, Wolf, Egeln, Almus, Schrumpf, and Feldotto (1998) examine the eﬀects of vocational
training on the labour market mismatch using the data from 35 local labour oﬃce districts in
East Germany. They observe only very small eﬀects on the matching eﬃciency which disappear
in the long-run.
Schmid, Speckesser, and Hilbert (2000) use yearly data from 142 local labour oﬃce districts to
estimate the eﬀects of further training, retraining, public sector job creation and wage subsidies
on long-term unemployment in the period 1994-1997. They ﬁnd that job creation programmes
reduce only ’short’ long-term unemployment (6-24 months), whereas vocational training reduces
long-term unemployment (> 24 months).
Hagen and Steiner (2000) evaluate vocational training, job creation schemes and structural
adjustment schemes in East and West Germany using the data from local labour oﬃce districts.
The time period under consideration diﬀers and ranges from 1990-1999. The estimated net
eﬀects are not very promising as all measures increase unemployment in West Germany. Only
SAS reduces the unemployment rate slightly in East Germany, whereas JCS and VT increase
it, too.
Blien et al. (2002) analyse the eﬀects of ALMP on the development of regional employment
in Eastern Germany and ﬁnd positive impacts. They use detailed data form the employment
statistics and the time span of 1993-99. Their regional units are 112 districs (’Landkreise / kre-
isfreie St¨ adte’). Their method is an econometric equivalent to conventional shift-share analysis
(based on constrained regression), which is extended to include many determining variables.
5 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis exploits a pooled time-series cross-section data set for the German labour
oﬃce districts. The time span ranges from the ﬁrst quarter 1999 to the fourth quarter 2001,
leaving us 12 observations for each labour oﬃce district. As discussed in section 4, the immense
diﬀerences between the East and the West German labour market make it necessary to analyse
both areas separately. The number of cross sections for West Germany are 141 and 34 for East
Germany.9
5.1 Speciﬁcation and Estimation
For the analysis of the eﬀects of ALMP on the job seeker rate, the basic equation we want to
estimate is
c(L)sit = a0 +
3 X
j=1
aj(L)Ã
j
it +
K X
k=1
bk(L)xk
it + uit; (1)
where sit is the regional rate of total job seekers relative to the labour force, Ã
j
it (for j =
1;2;3) is a measure for the ALMP programmes and xk
it (for k = (1;¢¢¢;K)) is a set of K other
9Due to data limitations, Berlin is excluded from the analysis.
12explanatory variables. As usual in the panel context, all variables are indexed by t = (1;¢¢¢;T)
as a time index and i = (1;¢¢¢;N) is an index for the regions. c(L) = 1¡c1L¡c2L2¡¢¢¢¡cpLp,
aj(L) = aj0 + aj1L + aj2L2 + ¢¢¢ + ajqLq and bk(L) = bk0 + bk1L + bk2L2 + ¢¢¢ + bkqLq are
associated polynomials in the lag operator with p and q as the maximum lag, where q need not
be the same for all explanatory variables. The rate of total job seekers is given by the sum of
unemployed and participants in ALMP programmes relative to the labour force. The ALMP
programmes we analyse are divided into job creation schemes P1
it, structural adjustment schemes
P2
it and training programmes P3
it. Since the job seeker rate contains the ALMP participants, a
direct usage of the participation rates (i.e. programme participants relative to the labour force)
would bias our results. To avoid this, we follow Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) and utilize so
called accommodation ratios to express the regional ALMP activity. The accommodation ratios
are deﬁned as the stock of participants in a speciﬁc type of programme relative to the total rate
of job seekers, i.e.
Ã
j
it = P
j
it=(Uit +
3 X
k=1
Pk
it)
for j = (1;2;3). For the further analysis, the ALMP accommodation ratios will be sum-
marized as Ψit = [Ã1
it;Ã2
it;Ã3
it]. Finally Xit = [x1
it;¢¢¢;xK
it] includes national variables like the
national unemployment and vacancy rate, and seasonal dummies to control for cyclical and
seasonal factors.
The imposed dynamic speciﬁcation of equation (1) not only enables us to control for the
high persistence of quarterly labour market data but also to analyse the time lag between a
change of the ALMP activity and the associated impact on the regional job seeker rate. This is
particularly advisable if we bear possible locking-in eﬀects of ALMP programmes in mind. Our
description of the German situation in section 4.1 has shown that the average duration of the
programmes lies between 8 to 10 months. Therefore a lag of 4 quarters for the accommodation
ratios is advisable. In particular, we will impose 4 lag’s for the job seeker rate and for the ALMP
measures.
Equation (1) can be seen as a reduced form relationship that explains the job seeker rate as
a function of the ALMP measures and other variables.10
For the residual, we assume a conventional one way error-component structure:
uit = ¹i + vit (2)
with
E(¹i) = 0; E(vit) = 0 and E(vit¹i) = 0: for i = 1;¢¢¢;N and t = 5;¢¢¢;T (3)
and
10Using the job seeker rate as dependent variable allows us to draw conclusions for the regular rate of employ-
ment which is deﬁned as n = 1 ¡ s. The use of the job seeker rate would be problematic if ALMP programmes
would attract people from out of the labour force into the labour force. In this case there would be a movement
in the job seeker rate that should not be interpreted as a programme eﬀect. But since nearly all programme
participants are placed from the stock of unemployed this problem is negligible.
13E(vitvig) = 0 for i = 1;¢¢¢;N and g 6= t: (4)
Finally we follow Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) and also impose a standard as-
sumption concerning the initial conditions si1;si2;si3 and si4:
E(sigvit) = 0 for i = 1;¢¢¢;N ; t = 5;¢¢¢;T and g = 1;¢¢¢;4: (5)
Furthermore it is reasonable to assume that E(sit¹i) 6= 0 and E(Ψit¹i) 6= 0 because these
regional variables should be expected to be correlated with the regional eﬀect ¹i. In contrast,
Xit does not contain variables that are regionally speciﬁc and we can assume that E(Xit¹i) = 0
Due to the correlation of the regional variables with the regional speciﬁc eﬀect a conven-
tional OLS estimation would lead to biased results. Furthermore, in our dynamic speciﬁcation
with the lagged dependent as an explanatory variable also an usual within transformation is
problematic.11 Particularly the within estimator in the dynamic panel data context is biased
and its consistency depends on T being large.12
To overcome these problems of the conventional estimators in the dynamic panel data context
where the explanatory variables are correlated with the regional eﬀect, we will utilize the ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the system GMM
estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998).
The moment conditions that are used to identify equation (1) depend heavily on the spec-
iﬁcation of the model and the theoretical considerations. Therefore we will now present the
moment conditions that we set up for our estimations.
The ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) builds the
moment conditions on the equations in ﬁrst diﬀerences, where the regional eﬀect is removed:
c(L)∆sit =
3 X
j=1
aj(L)∆Ã
j
it +
K X
k=1
bk(L)∆xk
it + ∆uit:
For the lagged job seeker rate we can now set up the following linear moment conditions,
E(sit¡g∆uit) = 0; for t = 6;¢¢¢;T and 2 · g · t ¡ 1; (6)
where the beginning at t = 6 is reasoned by the inclusion of 4 lags. This moment condition
results from the assumed absence of serial correlation in vit in (4) and the initial conditions in
(5).
A major problem of the macroeconometric evaluation of ALMP is the interdependence be-
tween ALMP and the unemployment rate. With the intention of ALMP to counteract unem-
ployment, it is most natural to think of the decision on how much money is spent on ALMP
being determined by the unemployment rate. Generally, the level of ALMP activity is assumed
to be determined by a policy reaction function where the unemployment rate is only one ar-
gument besides others (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). As our discussion in section 4.2 has
11See e.g. Baltagi (2001).
12For the bias and the consistency of the within estimator in dynamic models see for example Nickell (1981)
and Ridder and Wansbeek (1990).
14shown, this is also true for Germany, as the allocation of funds to the local labour oﬃces is done
according to several indicators, including e.g. the job seeker rate and long-term unemployed.
As Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) note, one can hope that the utilization of accommodation
ratios in order to measure the ALMP activity weakens the problem of interdependence, because
it is a priori not clear if an increase of the unemployment rate leads to a more or less proportional
increase in the programme participation. Since the unemployment rate is a major part of the
job seeker rate, it is reasonable to assume that the job seeker rate and the accommodation
ratios are determined simultaneously. Following this discussion, we assume that the ALMP
accommodation ratios are endogenous, i.e. E(Ψigvit) 6= 0 for g · t. These considerations and
assumptions (4) and (5) enable us to build the following linear moment conditions analogously
to the lagged dependent variable:
E(Ψit¡g∆uit) = 0; for t = 6;¢¢¢;T and 2 · g · t ¡ 1 (7)
For the explanatory variables in Xit we assume that they are strictly exogenous, i.e.
E(Xigvit) = 0 for all g;t. In the case of strict exogenity, the full set of moment conditions
is given by: E(Xig∆uit) = 0 for t = 6;¢¢¢;T and 1 · g · T (Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer,
2000). But since Xit contains no regional information, this full set of moment conditions is not
informative in order to identify the parameters in bk(L). Therefore we simply use the ∆Xit to
instrument themselves, i.e. we impose the following K moment conditions:
E(∆Xit∆uit) = 0: (8)
In order to implement the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator with the moment conditions (6),
(7) and (8), we write the full set of moment conditions as
E(Z0
di∆ui) = 0; (9)
where Z0
di is deﬁned in the appendix C. The ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator then minimises
the quadratic distance ∆u0ZANZ0∆u, where AN is the weight matrix. Note that since all
moment conditions are linear in the parameters, the minimum distance expression can be solved
analytically. As weight matrix we use
AN =
"
N¡1
N X
i=1
Z0
i∆ui(¯1)∆ui(¯1)0Zi
#¡1
;
where ∆ui(¯1) are the residuals from a consistent one-step estimator ¯1. This one-step estimator
is calculated with the weight matrix AN = (N¡1 P
i Zi
0HD
i Zi)¡1, where HD
i is a (T¡5)£(T¡5)
matrix with 2’s on the main diagonal and -1’s on the sub-diagonals and zeros otherwise (Arellano
and Bond, 1991). If the vit are i.i.d. disturbances, the one-step and two-step estimates of the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator are asymptotically equivalent (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
As presented in Ahn and Schmidt (1995), the linear ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator does
not utilize all moment conditions that result from assumption (2)-(5). Furthermore, Monte
Carlo results from Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) have
shown that in certain cases the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator tends to be biased. As it
was shown by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000), a poor
15performance of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator can result from a high persistent pattern
in the dependent variable, or if the variance of the regional eﬀect ¹i exceeds the variance of
the residual vit. Unfortunately, both cases seem to be present in our model. First, it is well
known that the unemployment rate is highly persistent. Second, we observe for West Germany
a considerable variation in the regional job seeker rates (see Fig. B.3).
To overcome these drawbacks of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator, we also implement the
system GMM estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). This system GMM estimator
uses additional moment conditions for the equations in levels that result from restrictions on
the initial conditions. These conditions relate to the assumption that the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
dependent process is uncorrelated with the regional eﬀect. Applied to our case this implies the
following moment conditions for the job seeker rate
E(uit∆sit¡g) = 0; for t = 6;¢¢¢;T and g = 1;¢¢¢;4 ; (10)
where we regard for the inclusion of 4 lags in equation (1).13
Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) have shown that if the dependent and the inde-
pendent processes are mean stationary, these additional moment conditions for the equations
in levels are valid, although the assumption of mean stationary is stronger then necessary. If
our conditional model (1) has generated the sit process for a suﬃciently long time prior to our
sample for any inﬂuence of the initial conditions to be negligible, ∆sit will be uncorrelated with
the regional eﬀect provided that E(∆Ψit¹i) = 0 (Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer, 2000). Note
that if E(uit∆Ψit) 6= 0, obviously ∆sit would be correlated with ¹i. Therefore we also need to
assume that the Ψit process is uncorrelated with the regional eﬀect in ﬁrst diﬀerences. In this
case the following moment conditions are valid.
E(uit∆Ψit¡g) = 0; for t = 6;¢¢¢;T and g = 1;¢¢¢;4; (11)
where g starts at 1 because we assume that Ψit is endogenously determined.14
For the remaining variables which are not determined by a regional speciﬁc component,
we just impose the following k moment conditions, i.e these variables are used to instrument
themselves.
E(uitXit) = 0 (12)
As noted by Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000), the linear moment conditions for the
level equations render the nonlinear moment conditions suggested by Ahn and Schmidt (1995)
as redundant. Therefore a system estimator using the full set of moment conditions can be
implemented as a linear estimator. For the calculation of the system estimator write the moment
conditions (6), (7), (8), (10), (11) and (12) compactly as
E(Z0
iUi) = 0; (13)
where
Ui =
2
4 ∆ui
ui
3
5 and Zi =
0
@ Zdi 0
0 Zli
1
A:
13Note that due to the presence of the moment condition (6) the moment conditions for g > 4 would be
redundant. Additionally the following moment conditions are valid in our situation: E(ui5∆si5¡g) = 0 for
g = 1;2;3.
14Furthermore the additional moment conditions are valid for the ALMP measures: E(ui5∆Ψi5¡g) = 0 for
g = 1;2;3.
16Zli is the matrix of instruments for the level equations and is deﬁned in appendix C. The
estimation is then analogous to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator. As weight matrix for the
initial one-step estimates we follow Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) and use:
Hi =
0
@ HD
i 0
0 Ii
1
A;
where Ii is a (T ¡ 4) identity matrix.
In contrast to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator, there is no one-step estimator that is
asymptotically equivalent to the two-step estimator. The consistency of both GMM estimators
relies heavily upon the fact that there is no serial correlation in the residuals. Arellano and Bond
(1991) provide an asymptotic normal test statistic for ﬁrst- and second-order serial correlation
that is reported in our results. Furthermore Arellano and Bond (1991) note that since ∆vit is
assumed to be the ﬁrst diﬀerence of serial uncorrelated errors, the ﬁrst-order serial correlation
need not be zero for the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator.
In order to test the set of instruments, a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is reported.
This test is based on the minimised GMM criterion and is in the case of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
GMM estimator given by:
Jd = ∆u(¯2)
0ZAN(¯1)Z0∆u(¯2); (14)
where ¯2 relates to the two-step and ¯1 to the one-step estimates. Under the null of instru-
ment validity the Sargan test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with as many degrees
of freedom as overidentiﬁying restrictions.15 In order to test the additional moment conditions
of the system estimator, Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) suggested to use the diﬀerence
of the Sargan test for the system GMM estimator Js and the Sargan test for the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
GMM estimator Jd. This test is then asymptotically distributed as chi-square distribution with
dfs ¡ dfd degrees of freedom, where dfs and dfd are the degrees of freedom for the system and
the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator respectively.
A serious problem found in various Monte Carlo studies are the downward biased asymptotic
standard errors of the two-step estimates.16 This is because the standard expression for the
asymptotic variance ignores the presence of the estimated parameters in the weight matrix (Bond
and Windmeijer, 2002). In order to overcome this problem, we apply the ﬁnite sample correction
proposed by Windmeijer (2000). This ﬁnite sample correction accounts for the presence of the
estimated parameter ¯1 in the asymptotic variance of the two-step estimates:
Σ(¯2) =
1
N
[C0An(¯1)C];
where C =
@Z
0u(¯2)
@¯0
2 . The correction results from a ﬁrst series Taylor expansion that generates
an extra term as a function of the initial parameter estimates.17 Monte Carlo results have shown
that the corrected variance of the two-step estimator often provides more reliable inference with
15Note that this statistic can also be calculated for the one-step estimates, even though they are not het-
eroscedasticity consistent.
16See for example Arellano and Bond (1991).
17See Windmeijer (2000) or Bond and Windmeijer (2002) for details.
17size proportions similar to those of the one-step variance (Bond and Windmeijer, 2002). For
comparison we will present both the conventional and the corrected asymptotic variance in our
results.
A ﬁnal concern in our analysis regards the interpretation of the estimated parameters for the
ALMP measures. Due to the speciﬁcation with 4 lags for the ALMP measures, the interpretation
of the results is not straightforward. Furthermore, a contemporary eﬀect of ALMP that aﬀects
the contemporary job seeker rate has additionally an impact on the future job seeker rate due
to the autoregressive speciﬁcation. For these reasons we will calculate the lag coeﬃcients for
the ALMP measures. The lag coeﬃcients enable us to observe the eﬀect of an ALMP extension
in e.g. t ¡ 4 on sit directly. These direct eﬀects can be obtained by rewriting (1) as:
sit =
a0
c(L)
+
3 X
j=1
aj(L)
c(L)
Ã
j
it +
K X
k=1
bk(L)
c(L)
xk
it +
uit
c(L)
The lag coeﬃcients on the accommodation ratio j are then the individual terms in the inﬁnite
lag polynomial dj(L) = d0 +d1L+d2L2 ¢¢¢ =
aj(L)
c(L) . To ﬁnd a solution for these lag coeﬃcients
one can use dj(L)c(L) = aj(L) and equate the coeﬃcients (Greene, 2000).
Since the lag coeﬃcients are a nonlinear function of the terms in the polynomials c(L) and
aj(L), we use the delta method to calculate the standard errors. This method implies that the
variance covariance matrix for the coeﬃcients in dj(L) can be calculated from
Σ(dj) = GΣ(c;a)G0;
where G is a matrix of partial derivatives of the lag coeﬃcients with respect to the estimated
parameters and Σc;a is the covariance matrix for the estimated parameters (Greene, 2000).
The lag coeﬃcients describe the impact on the change of the job seeker rate in t+g originated
from an ALMP extension in t. Additionally it would be interesting to consider the whole eﬀect
resulting from an ALMP extension, i.e. the total change of the job seeker rate after g quarters.
This eﬀect can simply be calculated by the sum of the lag coeﬃcients, d0 + d1 + d2 + ¢¢¢ + dg.
These cumulated lag coeﬃcients enable us to assess the short- and medium-term eﬀects on the
job seeker rate resulting from an ALMP extension in t. In order to assess the consequences of
ALMP in the long-run, we will also report the long-run eﬀect that is simply given by the sum
of the lag coeﬃcients,
P1
i=0 dj;i =
aj(1)
c(1) (Greene, 2000).
5.2 Results
Let us now turn to the results which are estimated separately for West and East Germany. To
test the sensitivity of our results we present additionally to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced and the system
GMM estimator the results from the OLS and the within estimator.18
The estimation of the eﬀects of ALMP on the job seeker rate (JSR) in both regions is done
with the same model with the exception, that for West Germany the structural adjustment
schemes are not included. This is because the structural adjustment schemes are of minor
importance in West Germany. Tables A.2 - A.3 in the appendix show that there are on average
18All estimations were done with the DPD98 programme for Gauss. See Arellano and Bond (1998).
18only 62 people in SAS programmes in West Germany, whereas in East Germany there are
3.105 participants on average. The other ALMP measures namely job creation schemes and
vocational training are included for both regions. As stated above, all ALMP measures as well
as the lagged job seeker rate are included with 4 lags. The national unemployment rate (NUR)
and the national vacancy rate (NVR) are included with the ﬁrst and the second lag. Both
variables should account for the demand and supply situation on the national labour market
which inﬂuences the situation on regional labour markets. Since there is also a causality between
the regional labour market and the national labour market rate, both variables are included from
the ﬁrst lag on.19 Finally we have included seasonal dummies to control for the cyclic pattern
in the quarterly data.
For West Germany we have restricted the number of moment conditions for both GMM
estimators. This is advisable because the time dimension T = 12 is relatively large compared to
the number of cross sections N = 141. Since the moment conditions (6) and (7) use the whole
history (e.g. sit¡2;¢¢¢;si1) as instruments the number of overidentifying restrictions becomes
rather large. As discussed in Bond (2002) and Arellano and Bond (1998) the inclusion of too
many instruments may result in overﬁtting biases. To avoid this problem we do not use the
whole history as instruments in the moment conditions (6) and (7). For the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
GMM estimator we have truncated the history after t ¡ 8 and for the system GMM estimator
we have truncated it after t¡6.20 Note that even if we use the reduced set of instruments for the
system GMM estimator the number of moment conditions exceeds the number of cross sections.
Due to the conventional speciﬁcation of the moment conditions (e.g. see Blundell, Bond, and
Windmeijer (2000)) the two-step weight matrix is estimated from only N observations. In our
case, where we instrument the variables that contain no regional information with themselves
(i.e. these variables imply only T additional observations), the weight matrix for the system
GMM estimator is estimated with less observations than instruments anyway.21 Although the
system estimator suﬀers from this problem there is no evidence of an overﬁtting bias, so the
results for the system GMM estimator look most reliable. For East Germany this problem
is more severe since we have only 34 observations at hand. Due to the reduced number of
cross sections and the unchanged time dimension the GMM estimators are not very well suited.
Therefore we will only present the results from the within and the OLS estimator.
Results for West Germany Table A.4 in the appendix reports the results of the OLS
and within estimator for West Germany. In order to the test the speciﬁcation, a Wald test
of joint signiﬁcance and a test for ﬁrst- and second-order serial correlation is reported.22 For
both equations the Wald test statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis ¯ = 0 and
the test for ﬁrst-order serial correlation cannot reject the null, i.e. there is evidence for serial
correlated errors. If we compare the coeﬃcients for the ALMP measures, we ﬁnd that there are
no diﬀerences in the signs of the coeﬃcients. Noteworthy is here that the OLS estimates imply
19Note that the national unemployment rate is determined by regional unemployment rates and thus cannot
be strictly exogenous.
20The presence of the additional moment conditions for the level equations makes it advisable to truncate the
history at an earlier point in time compared to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator.
21In this case the weight matrix is calculated with a generalized inverse (see Arellano and Bond (1998) for
details).
22See Arellano and Bond (1991) for the test on serial correlation.
19a much more persistent pattern of our model compared with the within estimator. Following
Bond (2002) we measure the persistence of the autoregressive process by considering the sum of
the estimated coeﬃcients for the lagged depended variable, i.e. c1 + c2 + c3 + c4. For the OLS
estimator, the sum of the 4 coeﬃcients on the job seeker rate is 0.96 whereas it is -0.008 for the
within estimator. This coincides with the familiar result that the within estimator tends to be
downward biased, whereas the OLS estimator tends to be upward biased.
Table 3 shows the two-step results from the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator and the system
estimator with the conventional and the corrected standard errors. The initial one-step results
are reported in Table A.5 in the appendix. First, it is to note that the diﬀerences between the
one and the two-step estimates are marginal and that we base our analysis for West Germany
on the two-step estimates. For both GMM estimators we ﬁnd that the Wald statistic rejects the
null. The test for serial correlation rejects the null of second-order serial correlation for the ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced GMM estimator.23 For the system estimator there is no evidence of second-order
serial correlation, and some of ﬁrst-order serial correlation. The Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions cannot reject the set of instruments for both estimators. The diﬀerence between
both Sargan tests is 8.2 with 66 degrees of freedom, i.e. the additional set of instruments cannot
be rejected. Turning to the standard errors of the parameters, we observe a substantial diﬀer-
ence between the conventional and the corrected standard errors. Particularly the conventional
standard errors are much too small for both GMM estimators. Furthermore, since the corrected
standard errors are similar to the one-step standard errors, there is a clear evidence that the
conventional two-step standard errors are downward biased (see Windmeijer (2000)). This is
clearly also the case for the Wald test, where the corrected statistic for the system GMM esti-
mator amounts approximately 1 percent of the conventional statistic.24 Therefore we will base
our inference on the corrected standard errors.
Turning to the coeﬃcients on the ALMP measures, there is only one change in the signs that
refers to the second lag of the JCS measure. Considering the dynamic pattern for both GMM
estimators, the coeﬃcients for the job seeker rate sum up to 0.02 for the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM
and to 0.95 for the system GMM estimator.
Comparing the persistent pattern of all four estimators we ﬁnd that the OLS estimator
implies the most persistent pattern followed by the system GMM estimator, the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
GMM and ﬁnally by the within estimator. Therefore we obtain a result that is similar to
the ﬁndings of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000), where
this sequence was found for simulated AR(1) processes. Furthermore the substantial diﬀerence
between the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced and the system GMM estimator indicates that the inclusion of the
additional moment conditions for the level equations seems to be essential for the identiﬁcation
of the parameters. This may result from the highly persistent pattern of the job seeker rate or
from a considerable variation between the regions.
As presented above we will analyse the lag coeﬃcients of the ALMP measure in order to
assess their impacts on the job seeker rate.
23Since the calculation of the second-order test statistics failed for the corrected standard errors we use the
test statistic obtained from the conventional standard errors.
24See Bond and Windmeijer (2002) for Monte Carlo simulations.
20Table 3: Two Step DIF GMM and SYS GMM Estimation Results for West
Germanya
DIF GMM SYS GMM
Estimator Estimator
corrected corrected
Variable Param. t-value t-valueb Param. t-value t-valueb
CONST: - - - 0.3240 28.836 5.550
Job Seeker Rate JSRt¡1 0.4618 102.695 5.307 0.8678 593.004 17.330
JSRt¡2 -0.2517 -82.020 -4.217 -0.1059 -42.118 -1.391
JSRt¡3 -0.0159 -9.519 -0.541 0.1023 34.131 2.996
JSRt¡4 -0.1702 -26.373 -0.613 0.0931 38.334 0.796
Participants in Job JCSt -0.5682 -65.020 -5.301 -0.8159 -56.896 -5.680
Creation Schemes JCSt¡1 0.5786 43.974 4.984 0.8163 45.322 5.042
JCSt¡2 0.1082 9.910 0.936 -0.0120 -0.974 -0.131
JCSt¡3 0.1277 16.783 1.545 0.0926 11.155 1.418
JCSt¡4 -0.1374 -18.530 -1.276 -0.0800 -13.120 -1.217
Participants in V Tt -0.2408 -38.198 -3.801 -0.2035 -29.440 -4.874
Vocational Training V Tt¡1 0.1683 28.047 5.377 0.2226 30.271 6.084
V Tt¡2 -0.0782 -13.042 -3.198 -0.0681 -13.644 -3.105
V Tt¡3 0.0049 1.295 0.260 0.0265 4.632 1.232
V Tt¡4 -0.0647 -19.666 -2.144 -0.0394 -9.766 -1.814
National Unemployed NURt¡1 -0.0475 -0.614 -0.055 -2.1393 -27.386 -4.937
Rate NURt¡2 0.7782 12.827 1.319 -0.2681 -4.556 -1.027
National Vacancies NV Rt¡1 3.0178 15.320 0.863 -1.7298 -10.885 -1.295
Rate NV Rt¡2 -3.4925 -11.302 -3.094 -5.7844 -20.191 -3.741
Seasonal Dummy 1 SD1 0.0045 9.460 0.648 -0.0099 -22.964 -5.140
Seasonal Dummy 2 SD2 -0.0087 -10.050 -1.042 0.0005 0.510 0.065
Seasonal Dummy 3 SD3 -0.0142 -28.872 -1.397 -0.0017 -5.211 -0.546
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance (21) 1004452.75 3617.29 (21) 4089865.48 39629.64
Sargan test (115) 124.06 124.06 (181) 132.25 132.25
First-order serial correlation (141) -2.41 -2.23 (141) -2.09 -2.12
Second-order serial correlation (141) -0.74 - (141) 0.06 -
No. of observations (N;T) 141, 12 141, 12
aDegrees of freedom for the test statistics are in parenthesis.
DIF GMM is the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator.
SYS GMM is the system GMM estimator.
bCorrected standard errors as suggested by Windmeijer (2000).
21Figure 1: Cumulated Lag Coeﬃcients for Job Creation Schemes in West Germanya
Within Estimator OLS Estimator
DIF GMM Estimator SYS GMM Estimator
a DIF GMM and SYS GMM cumulated lag coeﬃcients result from two-step estimates with corrected standard
errors; Standard errors for OLS and within are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity.
22Figure 2: Cumulated Lag Coeﬃcients for Vocational Training in West Germanya
Within Estimator OLS Estimator
DIF GMM Estimator SYS GMM Estimator
a DIF GMM and SYS GMM cumulated lag coeﬃcients result from two-step estimates with corrected standard
errors; Standard errors for OLS and within are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity.
23We choose to calculate the lag coeﬃcients up to t+6 quarters and to summarize the eﬀects
beyond this timeframe with the long-run eﬀect. The lag coeﬃcients and the long-run eﬀect for
both measures are reported in table A.6. Furthermore the cumulated lag coeﬃcients are plotted
in ﬁgure 1 for job creation schemes and in ﬁgure 2 for vocational training programmes.
For job creation schemes it can be seen that the cumulated lag coeﬃcients resulting from
the OLS, the within and the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator are quite similar. For all these
estimators we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect at the beginning that vanishes after the ﬁrst
quarter. Only the system estimates bear evidence of a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect until t + 6.
Looking at the long-run eﬀects, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect for the job creation schemes.
Therefore we conclude that the job creation schemes in West Germany only are able to reduce
the job seeker rate in the short-run.
Turning to vocational training programmes we ﬁnd a quite diﬀerent pattern. For the ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced and the system GMM estimator as well as for the within estimator we ﬁnd throughout
a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect. Only for the OLS estimator the eﬀect is at t+3 not signiﬁcant. The
long-run eﬀects are for all estimators negative signiﬁcant. Hence we conclude that the vocational
training programmes in West Germany have a throughout negative eﬀect on the job seeker rate.
Furthermore the cumulated lag coeﬃcients resulting from the system estimator decline after
t+3. This stronger negative eﬀect on the job seeker rate can possible be explained by a locking
in eﬀect as described in section 3.
Results for East Germany The results for the OLS and the within estimator are presented
in Table 4. Similar to West Germany, the Wald test rejects the null and there is evidence of
ﬁrst-order serial correlation. One important thing to note is that the OLS estimator implies
an unstable path for the job seeker rate. Therefore the within estimator seems to be the most
reliable estimator for East Germany although the ﬁnite sample bias with T = 12 should not
be negligible. In order to assess the eﬀects of the ALMP measures, we will again analyse the
cumulated lag coeﬃcients. The lag coeﬃcients resulting from the OLS and the within estimator
can be found in Table A.7 in the appendix. Figure 3 shows the cumulated lag coeﬃcients for
job creation schemes, structural adjustment schemes and vocational training programmes for
East Germany. For the job creation schemes we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the job
seeker rate. The long-run eﬀects are always insigniﬁcant, too. Since this result holds for the
within and the OLS estimator we may see this as an evidence that the job creation schemes
have no eﬀect on the job seeker rate in East Germany. Considering the structural adjustment
schemes, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect that appears after 4 quarters. This pattern is observed for
both estimators, whereas the eﬀect remains weakly signiﬁcant in the long-run for the within
estimator. Finally we ﬁnd that for vocational training programmes there are major diﬀerences
between the OLS and the within estimator. In particular we ﬁnd for the within estimator an
insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect that remains insigniﬁcant in the long-run. In contrast, the results
from the OLS estimator indicate a negative eﬀect after the second quarter. But since the OLS
estimates determine an explosive path for the job seeker rate (what should be seen as an evidence
that the OLS estimates of the autoregressive parameters are upward biased) the result is not
reliable. Furthermore, since the within estimator is also biased, a profound statement about the
eﬀects of vocational training in East Germany cannot be made.
24Table 4: OLS and Within Estimation Results for East Germanya
OLS Within
Estimator Estimator
Variable Param. t-value Param. t-value
CONST: 0.2725 3.820 - -
Job Seeker Rate JSRt¡1 0.6563 8.982 0.4527 7.725
JSRt¡2 -0.2031 -2.042 -0.2138 -2.933
JSRt¡3 0.1112 1.331 0.0230 0.387
JSRt¡4 0.4431 5.339 0.4878 5.826
Participants in Job JCSt -0.0117 -0.348 0.0028 0.081
Creation Schemes JCSt¡1 0.0161 0.394 0.0124 0.378
JCSt¡2 0.0010 0.032 -0.0007 -0.023
JCSt¡3 0.0156 0.593 0.0157 0.727
JCSt¡4 -0.0175 -1.060 -0.0129 -0.852
Participants in Struct. SASt -0.1063 -2.703 -0.0921 -2.078
Adjustment Schemes SASt¡1 0.0918 1.771 0.0674 1.594
SASt¡2 0.0037 0.082 0.0058 0.138
SASt¡3 -0.0227 -0.637 -0.0064 -0.173
SASt¡4 -0.0184 -0.531 -0.0850 -2.355
Participants in V Tt -0.0625 -1.458 -0.0822 -1.718
Vocational Training V Tt¡1 0.0494 1.015 0.0899 1.859
V Tt¡2 -0.0737 -1.608 -0.0084 -0.215
V Tt¡3 -0.0522 -1.210 -0.0379 -1.006
V Tt¡4 0.0313 0.845 0.0929 2.0182
National Unemployed NURt¡1 -3.0282 -3.253 -1.7227 -2.066
Rate NURt¡2 0.2606 0.320 0.7671 1.039
National Vacancies NV Rt¡1 0.9597 0.463 3.5191 1.930
Rate NV Rt¡2 -2.5526 -1.236 -1.4448 -0.880
Seasonal Dummy 1 SD1 0.0083 2.269 0.0145 3.864
Seasonal Dummy 2 SD2 0.0163 1.292 0.0114 1.174
Seasonal Dummy 3 SD3 0.0035 0.721 -0.0036 -0.694
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance (26) 177368.99 (26) 19908.77
Sargan test - -
First-order serial correlation (34) 3.77 (34) -3.80
Second-order serial correlation (34) 2.39 (34) 0.21
No. of observations (N;T) 34,12 34,12
aDegrees of freedom for the test statistics are in parenthesis.
Asymptotic standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to
heteroscedasticity.
25Figure 3: Cumulated Lag Coeﬃcients East Germanya
Job Creation Schemes
Within Estimator OLS Estimator
Structural Adjustment Schemes
Within Estimator OLS Estimator
Vocational Training
Within Estimator OLS Estimator
a Asymptotic standard errors are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity.
266 Conclusion
We were interested in estimating the net eﬀects of ALMP in Germany. As microeconomet-
ric evaluations usually ignore impacts on the non-participants, we used a macroeconometric
approach to analyse the eﬀects of job creation schemes, structural adjustment schemes and
vocational training on the employment situation in Germany for the time span from 1999 to
2001.
As a starting point of our analysis, we discussed various channels through which ALMP
might inﬂuence the whole economy in a theoretical framework. Following that, we stressed the
importance of suitable data for evaluation purposes which allow to take regional heterogene-
ity into account. This matters especially for the time period under consideration because the
introduction of the New Social Code SGB III in 1998 decentralized the institutional organi-
zation of labour market policy in Germany, allowing more ﬂexibility in the regional allocation
of resources to diﬀerent measures. Due to this fact, any evaluation has to give more consid-
eration to regional aspects than before. To do so we used a regional data set for 175 labour
oﬃce districts in West and East Germany. The availability of quarterly data allowed us to take
dynamics and persistency on the labour market into account. The fact that there are major
diﬀerences between the East and the West German labour markets made a separate estimation
for both areas necessary. We based our empirical speciﬁcation on a reduced form relationship to
evaluate the impact of ALMP on the total rate of job seekers, i.e. the openly unemployed and
the programme participants. To control for the problems arising from a dynamic panel data
model, we applied the GMM estimation procedures suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). Furthermore we used the two-step standard error correction pro-
posed by Windmeijer (2000) to make reliable inference about the two-step estimates. Within
those methods for dynamic panel data models we also accounted for the inherent simultaneity
problem of ALMP.
Our results indicate for West Germany that vocational training has a negative signiﬁcant
eﬀect, that is vocational training is able to reduce the job seeker rate. For job creation schemes
we ﬁnd negative eﬀects only in the short-term that become insigniﬁcant in the long-term.
As there were only a small number of regional units at hand the results for East Germany
should be handled with care. In this situation the within estimator seems to be the most reliable
one. For job creation schemes we do not ﬁnd any evidence of a signiﬁcant eﬀect, whereas for
structural adjustment schemes there is a weak evidence for a negative eﬀect in the medium-term.
For vocational training diﬀerent results from diﬀerent estimators indicate that the reliability of
the results is very questionable.
A major task for future work is to analyse the several eﬀects of ALMP with a structural
model. Since a reduced form approach can only measure the net eﬀect of ALMP, the diﬀerent
channels through which ALMP might eﬀect the economy cannot be detected. The major problem
here is the lack of suitable data that would allow to consider the eﬀects of ALMP on the
matching eﬃciency or on the wages. Basically, the ideal macroeconomic evaluation requires
three things: First of all, a well developed macroeconomic theory which is, secondly, applicable
in an econometric framework and ﬁnally does not fail due to data limitations.
27A Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Germany
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Number of labour oﬃce districts: 175
No. of observations: 2100
Time Range: 1999:1 - 2001:4
Quarterly Average Measures
Participants in JCS 1041 1682 3 12547
Participants in SAS 653 1468 0 9091
Participants in VT 1890 1407 255 8500
Unemployment 20855 14108 3331 88317
Dependent Labour Force 200124 112471 54113 991637
Regional Information
Area (in hectare) 203502 134599 16406 813574
Additional National Data
National Unemployed 3943250 206213 3688358 4402852
National Vacancies 492768 49220 413141 562266
National Labour Force 41668 281 41116 42068
28Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for West Germany
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Number of labour oﬃce districs: 141
No. of observations: 1692
Time Range: 1999:1 - 2001:4
Quarterly Average Measures
Participants in JCS 356 339 3 2181
Participants in SAS 62 107 0 1241
Participants in VT 1227 930 255 8500
Unemployed 17092 11282 3331 88317
Dependent Labour Force 201539 119919 59864 991637
Regional Information
Area (in hectare) 176204 95609 16406 478275
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for East Germany
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Number of labour oﬃce districs: 34
No. of observations: 408
Time Range: 1999:1 - 2001:4
Quarterly Average Measures
Participants in JCS 3882 2019 1048 12547
Participants in SAS 3105 1894 514 9091
Participants in VT 3813 1422 1139 8197
Unemployment 36462 13946 10671 74296
Dependent Labour Force 194258 73800 54113 368984
Regional Information
Area (in hectare) 316708 198754 56906 813574
29Table A.4: OLS and Within Estimation Results for West Germanya
OLS Within
Estimator Estimator
Variable Param. t-value Param. t-value
CONST: 0.2774 6.544 - -
Job Seeker Rate JSRt¡1 0.8514 15.026 0.4577 5.394
JSRt¡2 -0.1324 -1.734 -0.2736 -4.445
JSRt¡3 0.1310 4.156 0.0025 0.860
JSRt¡4 0.1182 0.952 -0.1948 -0.632
Participants in Job JCSt -0.3992 -6.294 -0.3818 -5.131
Creation Schemes JCSt¡1 0.4024 3.991 0.2623 3.709
JCSt¡2 0.1723 1.947 0.2172 1.694
JCSt¡3 -0.0706 -1.509 -0.0063 -0.107
JCSt¡4 -0.0809 -1.346 -0.1336 -1.221
Participants in V Tt -0.1111 -5.420 -0.1418 -4.408
Vocational Training V Tt¡1 0.1465 5.365 0.1107 6.045
V Tt¡2 -0.0509 -2.997 -0.0559 -2.510
V Tt¡3 0.0349 2.344 0.0116 0.839
V Tt¡4 -0.0516 -2.216 -0.0821 -2.841
National Unemployed NURt¡1 -2.0823 -4.931 -0.0575 -0.067
Rate NURt¡2 -0.0787 -0.390 1.2318 -3.595
National Vacancies NV Rt¡1 -3.2884 -2.563 1.8873 0.542
Rate NV Rt¡2 -2.7993 -2.273 -0.6821 -0.842
Seasonal Dummy 1 SD1 -0.0095 -6.465 0.0057 0.764
Seasonal Dummy 2 SD2 0.0071 0.968 -0.0015 -0.201
Seasonal Dummy 3 SD3 0.0020 0.725 -0.0133 -1.203
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance (21) 143600.99 (21) 7431.45
Sargan test - -
First-order serial correlation (141) 3.18 (141) -3.85
Second-order serial correlation (141) 1.90 (141) -0.00
No. of observations (N;T) 141,12 141,12
aDegrees of freedom for the test statistics are in parenthesis.
Asymptotic standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to
heteroscedasticity.
30Table A.5: One Step DIF and SYS Estimation Results for West Germanya
DIF GMM SYS GMM
Estimator Estimator
Variable Param. t-value Param. t-value
CONST: - - 0.3252 6.562
Job Seeker Rate JSRt¡1 0.4531 5.243 0.8673 16.972
JSRt¡2 -0.2460 -3.993 -0.1070 -1.437
JSRt¡3 -0.0150 -0.527 0.1029 3.148
JSRt¡4 -0.1869 -0.673 0.0934 0.793
Participants in Job JCSt -0.5722 -5.723 -0.7995 -5.733
Creation Schemes JCSt¡1 0.5646 5.056 0.7956 5.086
JCSt¡2 0.1176 0.125 -0.0057 -0.063
JCSt¡3 0.1315 1.721 0.0861 1.355
JCSt¡4 -0.1388 -1.318 -0.0782 -1.275
Participants in V Tt -0.2456 -3.774 -0.2054 -5.285
Vocational Training V Tt¡1 0.1679 5.127 0.2232 6.220
V Tt¡2 -0.0769 -3.760 -0.0676 -3.466
V Tt¡3 0.0053 0.312 0.0256 1.395
V Tt¡4 -0.0690 -2.388 -0.0397 -1.644
National Unemployed NURt¡1 -0.0640 -0.077 -2.1747 -4.839
Rate NURt¡2 0.8247 1.443 -0.2378 -0.927
National Vacancies NV Rt¡1 3.1582 0.872 -1.7876 -1.329
Rate NV Rt¡2 -3.5434 -2.959 -5.7617 -3.762
Seasonal Dummy 1 SD1 0.0048 0.692 -0.0100 -5.913
Seasonal Dummy 2 SD2 -0.0087 -0.987 0.0008 0.104
Seasonal Dummy 3 SD3 -0.0104 -1.426 -0.0018 -0.649
Wald test of joint signiﬁcance (21) 3767.18 (21) 47579.13
Sargan test - -
First-order serial correlation (141) -3.84 (141) -2.25
Second-order serial correlation (141) -0.60 (141) 0.09
No. of observations (N;T) 141,12 141,12
aDegrees of freedom for the test statistics are in parenthesis.
Asymptotic standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to
heteroscedasticity.
DIF GMM is the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator.
SYS GMM is the system GMM estimator.
31Table A.6: Lag Coeﬃcients for West Germany
OLS Estimator Within Estimator
Programme lag cum. lag cum.
coeﬀ. s.e. lag coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. lag coeﬀ. s.e.
JCS t -0.3992 0.0634 -0.3992 0.0634 -0.3818 0.0744 -0.3818 0.0744
t + 1 0.0625 0.0526 -0.3367 0.0642 0.0876 0.0551 -0.2943 0.0836
t + 2 0.2783 0.0567 -0.0584 0.0666 0.3617 0.1061 0.0675 0.0955
t + 3 0.1059 0.0786 0.0475 0.1190 0.1343 0.0746 0.2018 0.1567
t + 4 -0.0666 0.0762 -0.0191 0.1805 -0.0966 0.0488 0.1052 0.1863
t + 5 -0.0269 0.0539 -0.0460 0.2230 -0.0971 0.0325 0.0081 0.1701
t + 6 0.0327 0.0138 -0.0134 0.2405 -0.0881 0.1475 -0.0800 0.0999
long run - - 0.7551 1.1141 - - -0.0420 0.0894
VT t -0.1112 0.0205 -0.1112 0.0205 -0.1418 0.0322 -0.1418 0.0322
t + 1 0.0518 0.0125 -0.0593 0.0209 0.0457 0.0167 -0.0961 0.0309
t + 2 0.0079 0.0141 -0.0515 0.0214 0.0039 0.0227 -0.0922 0.0308
t + 3 0.0202 0.0123 -0.0312 0.0239 0.0005 0.0155 -0.0917 0.0360
t + 4 -0.0418 0.0085 -0.0730 0.0244 -0.0551 0.0295 -0.1469 0.0520
t + 5 -0.0311 0.0124 -0.1041 0.0304 -0.0343 0.0074 -0.1811 0.0531
t + 6 -0.0174 0.0137 -0.1214 0.0410 -0.0013 0.0125 -0.1825 0.0449
long run - - -1.0171 0.2365 - - -0.1562 0.0458
First Diﬀerence GMM Estimatora System GMM Estimatora
Programme lag cum. lag cum.
coeﬀ. s.e. lag coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. lag coeﬀ. s.e.
JCS t -0.5682 0.1072 -0.5682 0.1072 -0.8159 0.1436 -0.8159 0.1436
t + 1 0.3162 0.0983 -0.2520 0.1085 0.1083 0.0539 -0.7076 0.1545
t + 2 0.3972 0.0914 0.1452 0.1646 0.1684 0.0559 -0.5392 0.1971
t + 3 0.2405 0.0931 0.3857 0.2381 0.1438 0.0637 -0.3953 0.1994
t + 4 -0.0346 0.0920 0.3511 0.3035 -0.0379 0.0854 -0.4332 0.1892
t + 5 -0.1366 0.0802 0.2145 0.2439 -0.0208 0.0560 -0.4540 0.2091
t + 6 -0.1258 0.1726 0.0886 0.1619 0.0163 0.0268 -0.4377 0.2230
long run - - 0.1115 0.1489 - - 0.0238 1.0003
VT t -0.2407 0.0633 -0.2408 0.0633 -0.2035 0.0417 -0.2035 0.0417
t + 1 0.0571 0.0246 -0.1836 0.0590 0.0460 0.0155 -0.1574 0.0468
t + 2 0.0087 0.0316 -0.1749 0.0610 -0.0066 0.0176 -0.1640 0.0575
t + 3 -0.0016 0.0200 -0.1765 0.0687 -0.0049 0.0174 -0.1689 0.0633
t + 4 -0.0275 0.0576 -0.2040 0.0749 -0.0572 0.0109 -0.2261 0.0624
t + 5 -0.0222 0.0124 -0.2262 0.0786 -0.0455 0.0106 -0.2716 0.0653
t + 6 -0.0048 0.0156 -0.2310 0.0678 -0.0345 0.0135 -0.3061 0.0728
long run - - -0.2156 0.0610 - - -1.4452 0.5575
aTwo step estimates with corrected standard errors.
32Table A.7: Lag Coeﬃcients for East Germany
OLS Estimator Within Estimator
Programme lag cum. lag cum.
coeﬀ. s.e. lag coeﬀ. s.e. coeﬀ. s.e. lag coeﬀ. s.e.
JCS t -0.0117 0.0336 -0.0117 0.0336 0.0028 0.0345 0.0028 0.0345
t + 1 0.0084 0.0217 -0.0033 0.0234 0.0137 0.0204 0.0165 0.0258
t + 2 0.0089 0.0140 0.0056 0.0317 0.0049 0.0181 0.0214 0.0384
t + 3 0.0184 0.0159 0.0241 0.0284 0.0151 0.0180 0.0365 0.0416
t + 4 -0.0115 0.0142 0.0126 0.0354 -0.0055 0.0181 0.0310 0.0539
t + 5 -0.0066 0.0098 0.0060 0.0403 0.0011 0.0095 0.0321 0.0582
t + 6 0.0040 0.0070 0.0100 0.0463 0.0044 0.0084 0.0365 0.0653
long run - - -0.4576 2.0907 - - 0.0693 0.1368
SAS t -0.1063 0.0393 -0.1063 0.0393 -0.0921 0.0443 -0.0921 0.0443
t + 1 0.0221 0.0398 -0.0842 0.0484 0.0257 0.0382 -0.0664 0.0577
t + 2 0.0397 0.0354 -0.0445 0.0531 0.0371 0.0378 -0.0292 0.0575
t + 3 -0.0129 0.0362 -0.0574 0.0558 0.0027 0.0423 -0.0265 0.0642
t + 4 -0.0796 0.0302 -0.1370 0.0516 -0.1360 0.0443 -0.1625 0.0760
t + 5 -0.0354 0.0246 -0.1724 0.0573 -0.0488 0.0256 -0.2113 0.0837
t + 6 0.0091 0.0217 -0.1633 0.0624 0.0252 0.0258 -0.1861 0.0882
long run - - 6.8461 7.8024 - - -0.4407 0.2751
VT t -0.0625 0.0429 -0.0625 0.0429 -0.0822 0.0479 -0.0822 0.0479
t + 1 0.0084 0.0361 -0.0541 0.0510 0.0525 0.0445 -0.0297 0.0653
t + 2 -0.0555 0.0280 -0.1096 0.0507 0.0329 0.0332 0.0032 0.0789
t + 3 -0.0973 0.0336 -0.2069 0.0530 -0.0361 0.0326 -0.0329 0.0793
t + 4 -0.0480 0.0225 -0.2549 0.0493 0.0302 0.0380 -0.0027 0.1009
t + 5 -0.0142 0.0223 -0.2692 0.0554 0.0478 0.0368 0.0450 0.1289
t + 6 -0.0350 0.0132 -0.3042 0.0618 0.0304 0.0195 0.0754 0.1433
long run - - 14.2143 15.718 - - 0.2144 0.2717
.
33B Figures
Figure B.1: Participants in ALMP and Unemployed in West Germany, 04/98-04/01
Figure B.2: Participants in ALMP and Unemployed in East Germany, 04/98-04/01
34Figure B.3: Job Seeker Rate in Germany (Monthly Average), 1999(a)
Labour Office District Border
State Branch of the FEO
100 km
Stuttgart
Nuremberg
Saarbruecken
Frankfurt
Duesseldorf
Halle
Chemnitz
Berlin
Hanover
Kiel
under 9.0%
(52 Labour Office Districts)
9.0% until 11.5% (46)
11.5% until 22.0% (52)
over 22.0% (31)
(a) The job seeker rate is deﬁned as the unemployment rate extended by the rate of people participating in
ALMP measures.
35Figure B.4: Relation Between Job Creation Schemes and Training Measures, 1999
Labour Office District Border
State Branch of the FEO
100 km
Stuttgart
Nuremberg
g
Saarbruecken
Frankfurt
Duesseldor
f
Halle
Chemnitz
Berlin
Hanover
Kiel
under 0.25
(62 Labor Office Districts)
0.25 until 0.5 (63)
0.5 until 1.0 (31)
over 1.0 (25)
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